Exposition on Joel - Introduction - 3

     Several themes surface throughout the progress of Joel’s prophesy: the Day of the Lord and repentance. Then again, one could say that Joel’s style is really just characterized by variations on one theme—repentance. In chapter one he uses the drunkard, the priest, the invading army and later, the final Day of Judgment, all as means of calling the nation to corporate repentance. And in chapters 2 and 3 we see the promises of judgment and salvation finally meted out in the Day of the Lord: an eschatological final day which is depicted throughout redemptive history in lesser, but still terrible, days of destruction and deliverance. We observe one of the more prominent features of the promises and fulfillment to God’s beneficiaries in His Spirit: promised in Joel chapter 3 and fulfilled in Acts chapter 2. We can also observe the importance of the themes of the mourning and the lamenting of the sin of Judah; and of course a call to their repentance, which necessarily becomes a call to consecrate fasting and assembly in order to corporately lament the sins of the nation. In addition the mention of the mourning of the very land itself—the beasts of the field, the pastures, vineyards, the languishing olive groves and the gladness of the people having dried up along with the impoverishment of their physical resources.

Specifically regarding the Day of the Lord, Joel uses the term to describe 2 events: the recent torment on the land, an army described as locusts in chapter one, and the future and terrible Day wherein the evil nations will be judged in the Valley of Jehoshaphat, described in chapter 2. Unlike most of the other prophets, simply warning the people by predicting the actual futuristic nature of the coming Day of Yahweh or the Day of the Lord, in Joel it is more so the gasoline fueling the fire of His oracles. So significant is the concept of the DotL to Joel’s prophesy that it is strategically placed in every one of the four major subsections of the book, thus making it undeniable crucial to the idea God had for Joel to preach. The concept of that Day in the book of Joel follows a pattern similar to the OT prophecies of Christ coming: as we know today, Christ’s coming was to be two-fold: first in humiliation and second and finally in His coming in glory. The OT saint likely had confused the two due to their frequent compression, as they were often spoken of as though they were one future “coming”, and in like manner, the OT saint had likely confused the final deliverance that could be expected by believers at the DotL with the destruction that was to be expected at the DotL. So they were shocked to learn of their exile as a form of the punishment provided for in the context of the DotL. The notion of the Day of the Lord is more fully expressed in the New Testament where we get a more complete picture than that provided by any pre-Messianic prophesy. And such is the nature of prophesy in general, it normally follows this pattern: prophesy, then fulfillment, and then understanding. However, it can be demonstrated by our present concern in Joel that understanding is truly partial when we look at how the Jews in the OT thought of the Day of the Lord. After Joel’s prophesy and prior to the NT exposition of the concept, most Jews regarded the Day as being exclusively a day when the wrongs perpetrated against the people of Israel would be righted. But in Joel and in some NT passages we discover that unbelieving Jews (an unbelief manifest in gross and perpetual disobedience) will be judged in that Day along with the evildoers of other nations.

You see, in Joel’s day and even in Christ’s day, especially before Paul in Eph. 2:11-22 helped reform the world’s understanding of the mystery that ALL nations would be brought into the commonwealth of Israel via their adoption through the blood of the Ultimate and final Passover Lamb, Jesus of Nazareth, and all those (Israeli and gentile) unbelievers would receive God’s wrath on that final Day. The Jews believed that their pedigree through the familial line of Abraham alone was their ticket to being the beneficiaries of God, regardless of their actions; no one, they thought, could take that from them. They believed, and thus rightly held in very high regard, that the ritual circumcision of an 8 day old babe ensured that none of God’s wrath would finally be poured out on that individual. But Paul in Romans 2 would later inform us that not all Israel are of Israel—it is our faith, which is the very gift of God, proved by our good works that separates God’s children from the children of the Devil, not the application of a covenant sign alone. Likewise with the continuation of covenant signage, now by the covenant baptism of our infants into visible church membership, we as parents and other onlookers who partake in the grace mediated by that sacrament, fully expect God to later regenerate that baptized baby—He has set His mark on that little helpless and virtually unresponsive one who will ordinarily inherit genuine belief. But those who have tasted of the benefits of God through this nurturing, yet finally apostatize and fall away are the exception to the rule, thus are much more liable to God’s severe wrath because they tasted His grace first hand; consider 2 Pet. 2:1-3.

Exposition on Joel - Introduction - 2

     Perhaps Joel’s ministry as God’s covenant lawyer (as the prophets were often considered) began sometime between the 6^th and 9^th dynasties of the Northern Kingdom. We do know for certain that it didn’t begin prior to 873, the beginning of the reign of Judah’s 4^th king named Jehoshaphat, due mainly to Joel’s mention of the Valley of Jehoshaphat, but probably sometime before the exile in 586, if you take the pre-exilic position. Even though that period between 873BC and 586 BC appears to be quite ambiguous enough not to draw any criticism, it still remains the minority report among those considering it. It is ones placement of Joel’s ministry on the “wrong” side of the exile which is the debated issue.

As a point of interest, if Joel’s ministry occurred very early on in the Kingdom timeline, then it probably overlapped the ministries of other prophets such as Elijah and Elisha. I’d like to point out here that when one goes looking, you can find some discrepancy in the years of the reigns of the kings of Israel and Judah, but much more variance in the ministries of the prophets, so take these associations loosely, just as a means of placing their lives in time, hopefully making them less abstract. So if Joel’s ministry occurred very early on, he could have ministered to monarchs like: Athaliah, queen of the South, Joash, Amaziah, Uzziah and Jotham. Whereas if one favors the later pre-exilic dating, then Joel would have enjoyed a time with contemporaries such as Zephaniah, Nahum, and perhaps even Isaiah and Jeremiah. And this later dating places Joel under the reign of kings like: Ahaz, Hezikiah, Manasseh, Amon and Josiah. But if the post-exilic dating proved true, then Joel would have shared his time of ministry with the likes of Daniel, Ezekiel (in the North), Habakkuk, and Malachi, who ministered to no kings because at that time the Jews had been exiled.

All of that information just to say that Joel mentions no king under which he prophesied, unlike Isaiah, Jeremiah, Hosea, and Amos, who provided relatively great detail concerning their place in the kingdom and the kings to which the Lord gave His word through those prophets.  ¹The word of the LORD that came to Joel, the son of Pethuel: Joel also gave no information about his vocation. It is however a general speculation that he may have been a temple priest due to the emphasis he places on the responsibilities of that office and how they suffered the lack and grain and drink offerings and how the priests mourned. Secondly, most agree that his ministry was concerned primarily with Judah, based partly on his mention of God’s holy mount Zion.

Joel, among other OT prophets, is considered an apocalypticist. In other words, among his writings are words of forth-telling that include a final end to the age of the world or cosmos as we know it. This is understood as God’s just and merciful act of judgment and of the final rewarding of His people. Another stylistic element to consider is that Joel’s prophecy in 2:1-11 bears a striking resemblance to that Isaiah’s in chapter 13. They share some vocabulary, themes, and the aspect of an invading foe. This comparison seems to support an early date for Joel rather than a later, because both portions of literature appear to be Pentateuchal in origin (Lev. and Deut.). Being established in Deut., Joel employs the justice of the covenantal curses for disobedience as the reasoning for the judgment of God on the nation that He called His own. He took well known historical events like the locust plague of Exodus and provided a new perspective in order to illustrate his prophesy. Note also that the presence of invasion, drought and desolation (three of the types of God’s judgment directed against the rebellious nation) are major punishments for infidelity to the Mosaic Covenant, and they were all precursors leading ultimately to physical exile from the Promised Land.

Like the majority of prophetic books, with the exception of much of the structure of Isaiah and Hosea, Joel follows the standard “woe-then-weal” format. It’s fairly easy to classify the first portion of the prophecy as distress, causing woe, and the second part as deliverance. Whereas the prophesies of Isaiah and Hosea, which of course are quite a bit larger, follow a format characterized by woe-weal-woe-weal, etc.

Though the final chapter of the book almost appears to be a completely separate prophecy, it seems more reasonable to conclude that the book is one cohesive prophecy possibly delivered at one time, but likely delivered in the span of a week or a month at most, due in part to the relative compression of the book: within 3 chapters there are tightly woven themes and ideas that cohere by similar word usage sprinkled over the course of the prophesy. Though the book has been traditionally broken into 3 chapters, there is reason to believe that it is structured in four different oracles medium in length, and if not given to the people at one time, perhaps in four separate revealings over a period of time, like I said, probably not spanning more than a month.

Exposition on Joel - Introduction - 1

     I would like to begin our study of the book of Joel with a bit of background information and at least cover the first verse of chapter one, which includes the prophet’s introduction of himself. Debated Jewish tradition dates Joel between Hosea and Amos, which is apparent from the canonical order. The tendency in ancient writings such as these was to group them chronologically, but there were occasions when the subject matter, style and vocabulary were the determining factors. As you all likely know, the grouping of books traditionally referred to as minor prophets gets its name from the Latin word meaning shorter, so their importance and eternal weight is neither attested to nor denied in that nomenclature. It is interesting to note that in the 3^rd century BC Septuagint, the Minor Prophets were divided into two groups, six and six, and the ordering being highly favorable of the chronology that was considered correct at the time. As far as the dating of Joel goes, this position seems to promote either a very late pre-exilic or post-exilic date of Joel’s prophecy, sometime between 600BC – 570BC. Following that line of thinking, there are several reasons for modern scholars to share the post-exilic (2^nd temple) opinion: It is claimed that Joel’s apocalyptic style is more like that of Daniel, Zechariah and parts of Isaiah. Most other pre-exilic prophets mention a reigning king, Joel does not. Joel’s perspective on foreign occupation (2:20; 3:3) and Diaspora (2:26; 3:6) seem consistent with the thoughts of other post-exilic prophets. But these reasons are not absolutely compelling. Apocalyptic literature has its origins at least as early as the 7^th century BC (Is. 13). Because of the close comparison of Joel 2:1-11 with that passage, it stands to reason that his apocalyptic preceded Zech. 1-8, thus placing him earlier than many think. Prior to “The” Exilic period, in the time between 722BC-586BC deportation and exile was a present reality due to the war-time policy of Assyria and other Near East nations, being one of the expected punishments of war. So Joel 3:7 doesn’t have to refer to the specific Israelite Exile we think of when we consider the times of the prophets.

Ultimately, any responsible scholar must side with Calvin when he says that it would be foolish to dogmatize about the dating of Joel’s prophecy. Regardless of date, the book’s message can be appreciated even though a period of ministry cannot be determined with any high degree of certainty. Nevertheless, many speculate out of necessity so as to help form a solid interpretation of the book’s prophecy. But whether one takes the post- or the late pre-exilic dating, the integrity of the book still stands. There is also a third opinion which states that the prophecy is early still, somewhere between 850-750. In any case, the book is God’s revealed Word, profitable as Paul puts it, for teaching, reproof, correction and training. Through the years it has been with a great deal of difficulty that commentators and bible enthusiasts alike have tried to date Joel’s prophesy and still today there is disagreement even within the specifically Reformed community. So as I mentioned briefly before, there are two primary positions on the dating of Joel’s prophecy: Some say that his prophesy was pre-exilic (a position which can be divided into early and late pre-exilic dating). The terms pre and post exilic, when applied to the ministries of the prophets refers to whether they prophesied before or after the Jews were exiled: the Jews of Israel to Assyria in 722 and the Jews of Judah to Babylon in 586.Yet another school of thought claims that Joel’s prophecy occurred after the fall of the Northern and Southern kingdoms.

Just some quick background concerning the Jewish kingdom and its division: Saul, David and Solomon were the only Jewish Kings to rule the temporal Kingdom of God united (1050 BC – 930 BC). America has already enjoyed a span of life nearly twice that of the united Jewish Kingdom, not that our nation is united in the quality that would have been demanded by the Jewish nation under monarchal rule. Nonetheless, the unity expected under the supposed godly rule of one man quickly dematerialized in a nation of sinners, and thus the Jewish nation (a pre-figuring of the Kingdom of God’s elect nation) was divided around 930 into two kingdoms: the Northern Kingdom called Israel and the Southern called Judah. In the 200 years following the division, due to their separation from the Davidic line, Israel experienced nine different dynastic reigns until it fell in 722 to the Assyrian empire. On the other hand, the tribes of Judah and Benjamin continued in the line of David with Rehoboam (son of Solomon) as their first king in the divided kingdom, but they too fell to the Babylonians in 586.

Exposition on Joel

     I've recently been charged with the task, and great pleasure, of leading the young adult fellowship at our church. The major portion of my responsibilities is to teach a bible study on Wednesday nights. I chose to go through the prophesy of Joel. so begins a blog series of the same material.

God's Knowledge, Who Can Know it? - part 20

Our choices and their immediate causes

This brings us to the discussion of how we make choices and why.  I have made the assertion that, regarding the choices we make, we necessarily could not have chosen otherwise but I would like to bring the words of other men to bear on the topic. This is what John Hendrix has to say regarding our choosing Christ.

“So if there is not of necessity any moral reason or motive that ultimately compels one to believe or not then how could God blame someone for rejecting Him? To believe the gospel is a moral choice, from the heart. If not then God could not call the rejection of the gospel a sin.  If our affections do not cause us to believe then belief and unbelief is ultimately non-affectional, not from the heart and rejection could not be considered a sin.  But if it is a moral choice then how did one person get a more moral disposition than the other?  One remained proud and the other humble?  Was this by nature or by grace? If by grace then why don’t all men have it? If by nature then some people are more virtuous than others apart from grace. This dilemma is really fatal to libertarian free will and none of them have been able to answer these basic questions.  The answer ‘just because’ is not enough. [i]”

Hendrix’s words assert that our choices are made because of our affections, not in spite of them. Clearly not all non-Calvinist/non-Reformed persons espouse an anthropology of libertarian free-will nor do they all claim to adhere to philosophical systems that promote a variation on the theory of middle knowledge. Though I must that I don’t know where else thinking individuals would likely rest on the issue of God’s foreknowledge, providence and His ability to carry out His plans in time as He wishes except that they claim either of the three main views: Open Theism (Process Theology), Molinism (Middle Knowledge) or Compatibilism.

When a worldview claims libertarian free will as one of its foundational tenets, one of two things result: either it makes a belief in original sin (at least the historic, biblical understanding of the term) a contradiction within their system, or it must be denied all together.  Listen to what they say about their own system. 

“Libertarians take very seriously the widespread judgment that we are morally responsible for our actions and that moral responsibility requires freedom” That is, a person cannot be held morally responsible for an act unless he or she was free to perform that act and free to refrain from it. This is basic moral intuition.[ii]”

If responsibility, as such a one would claim, is grounded in one’s ability to have chosen “X” or non-X without any compelling influences, then we don’t inherit guilt and condemnation from Adam (as the historical, biblical understanding promotes) but instead we inherit only the capacity to sin, thus denying the doctrine of original sin.  The other result is that such a one may accept the doctrine of original sin in some superficial sense but also claim that Christ died to make all men savable in order to give everyone the capacity for choosing God, thus leading to the contradiction in their system where men both, inherit Adam’s sin and maintain the ability to choose not to sin while still “counted in Adam”. I personally like what John Owen has to say regarding this man-made philosophy, and find it difficult to state it any better.

“To suppose that whatever God requireth of us that we have power of ourselves to do, is to make the cross and grace of Jesus Christ of none effect.[iii]”

He goes on to assess the libertarian view of creaturely freedom and his responsibility in a way with which I must agree.

“The essence of this view is that a free action is one that does not have a sufficient condition or cause prior to its occurrence…the common experience of deliberation assumes that our choices are undetermined.  [iv]”

I have heard it stated very often that men only go to Hell because of their personal unbelief. If this unbelief is a sin that finds its origin in the fallen affections of the human heart, a heart whose condition was inherited from Adam, then it is biblical to say that ultimately we are guilty and go to Hell because we are inherently sinners; unbelief being one of those sins for which the unregenerate man will be punished in Hell. As a result it would be more accurate, yes even more biblical, to say that one goes to Hell because they are a sinner unredeemed, and that their unbelief is one sin among many for which they will continue to render payment in Hell as they abide God’s wrath for an eternity. So if it is not simply my unbelief that causes my damnation, then on what foundation is human responsibility based? This forces us to answer a more telling question, why do we make the choices we do? According to the Libertarian, if our choices are to be considered free (and they must be in order for God to hold us responsible for them, according to the Libertarian) then they can have no determining factor, no sufficient condition or cause at all—not even our affections or desires are allowed to cause our choices, not even they are the antecedent cause for what we choose. But Libertarianism and Dynamic Pre-Temporalism do not establish culpability for our choices instead they absolve us of being responsible for the things we do. Rationality leads us to believe that the contrary is true, that only if our choices are born out of our desires can we be held responsible for those choices. As Hendrix stated before, if our choices are not born out of our desires and affections then it would be unfair for God to judge us by them. Here is Hendrix again on this topic.

“The Belief in Libertarian Free Will Destroys Moral Responsibility – Walls and Dongell make a strong case that our judicial system is based on the commonsense view of libertarian freedom since the lawyers often defend the degree of guilt of clients based on whether they were coerced, their upbringing, emotional state and the like.  These kind of conditions indeed often make people less culpable if their inability made them so they could not have done otherwise. If criminals could have made different choices than they did, i.e. if they were coerced into making a bad choice, then we all agree they would not be as legally responsible for their crime.  While it is true that coercion often plays a role in the legal degree of punishment, but this only scratches the surface of the matter. Consider the opposite that if criminals just chose to commit a crime but had no intent or motives for it at all then the lawyer would be forced to plead insanity for his client before the court. If the choice to commit a crime were not based and caused ultimately on a reason, desire or motive then he would have to be absolved from guilt because he would not be responsible for it. If one chose to murder someone simply because he chose to it would be a sign of sickness not responsibility. Libertarian free will, therefore, destroys responsibility.  Moral responsibility exists, not in spite of, but because our choices have reasons, motives, intent. Only the determinist, therefore, upholds moral responsibility. Can we be held responsible for doing something we do not want to do? [v]”

So we conclude that if our choices are not rooted in our natural affections, then God cannot hold us responsible for them because those choices would be arbitrary, thus making God’s judgment of them capricious. The only other option is that the choices we make are in fact rooted in our desires just as the proverb suggests (4:23).

---

[i] Hendryx, J. W. 'Just Because':  Eleven (11) Reasons to Reject Libertarian Free Will. Same source as  endnote number 3.

[ii] Walls, Jerry L, and Dongell, Joseph R. Why I am not a Calvinist. (InterVarsity Press, 2004)

[iii] Owen, John III: 433

[iv] Ibid.

[v] Hendryx, J. W. 'Just Because':  Eleven (11) Reasons to Reject Libertarian Free Will. Same source as endnote number 3.

God's Knowledge, Who Can Know it? - part 19

Preexistent potential realities?

In summary, I have divided into four categories the most likely views regarding the pre-temporal knowledge of and existence of future events and choices:

1.        A being greater than God created multiple, potential sets of realties from which Yahweh God must choose, yet Yahweh God knows all the events that would have taken place had He chosen otherwise.

a.        Explanation: This view is manifestly non-Christian. However it does make great science fiction. Logically though, if there existed a being greater (this other being has created potential realities from which Yahweh God must choose, thus making him greater) than the God of the Christian Scriptures, then that being would by definition, be God and the being to whom he submitted sets of potential realities from which to choose is a lesser being and, also by definition, could not be God—at least not the Creator God described in the Bible. The lesser being may not have been created by the being that generated the potential realities, but then again, the being that did may have created both of them, who knows? In other words, the being that created the possible realities is necessarily greater than the one who chooses from them, and the being who chooses becomes a non-God because he is subject to some force outside Himself that influences his choices.

2.        God conceived of multiple, potential sets of realities and then He chose from them. These sets exist only as thoughts until chosen, and in process, realized. They only exist in the first place because God has thought of them as potential realities. In effect God says I might do this, yet I might do this other thing—God considered what I would do and made His choice based on what He knew I would choose.

a.        Explanation: This view possibility challenges the perfection and wisdom of God.  The implication of this is, if God thought of two possible futures and chose to implement one into reality and not the other, and then the one discarded is inferior by virtue of its being discarded. That, in my opinion, is an untenable thought regarding anything God does. If one possible future was chosen above another then it must have been for the reason that it is better future in some way and to some degree, however insignificant the difference may be. If the choice is not made based on the intrinsic superior value of one potentiality above the other, then it must be based on exclusively on God’s knowledge of his creature’s future choices or else His choice must be considered arbitrary—that would be an attack on the purposefulness of God. If the former is true then God is ultimately subject to the power of the future choices that He knows His creatures will make. If the latter is true then God’s goodness would have to be called into question. God must act or choose with purpose in order to maintain His righteous character. To choose without purpose is in essence to choose without knowledge—and choosing without knowledge is something that is not possible with God, unless of course you are an Open Theist. God is by definition, all-knowing. If God knows everything past, present and future then His choices must be in accordance with that knowledge or else He would be making a decision against what He knows to be best. Even for creatures, a choice made with knowledge has at least that much purpose. Thus God’s choices made in perfect knowledge are perfect also in their purpose.

3.        Multiple sets of potential realities exist as a result of the mere possibility of their future realization through the choices made by possible creatures within each set. God must chose from those sets and the one He chooses becomes real as time goes on.

a.        Explanation: If these alternate thoughts from which God must choose were not from His own mind, then from whose mind did they come?  In the case of the possible strands of realities (futurabilia as Molina called them), it must be concluded that the generative source or sources of these strands were the thoughts, choices, and determinations of the subjects within the strands themselves.  And if this is so then the subjects had no objective primary cause—rendering them causes which in effect, cause themselves! In due course, one must draw the same conclusion here as with the previous view.

4.        God’s singular set of decrees lead to His creation, which includes the ends and the means to these ends (all creatures and their thoughts, choices, and actions are obviously included).

a.        Explanation: If this view is true, then there can be no other possible outcomes.  This view, referred to as Compatibilism, Reformed, or Static Pre-Temporalism as I have dubbed some of its specific aspects, I believe is the biblical model.

God's Knowledge, Who Can Know it? - part 18

   Many believers would oppose Open Theism when presented with its heresies by affirming that God does has perfect knowledge of the future, but it is only the Compatibilist who rightly says that God’s knowledge of and decree of future events and choices are inseparably related. Therefore the future, which God sees perfectly, finds its source in all of that which God desires to take place; not withstanding that God may desire one thing above another and may exhibit varying degrees of affection toward different things. And as I said before, I do not think that the Molinistic scheme actually accomplishes that which it is attempting to accomplish, namely that God is protected from being the ultimate cause of evil simply because real counterfactuals exist. If God knows perfectly the future choice that a man will make, if God knows that I will turn right at the light, then do I legitimately have the power of contrary choice, could I actually choose to turn left? The answer is no, of course not. Even if the potential reality that represented my choice to turn left did exist, God knew that I wouldn’t.

God's Knowledge, Who Can Know it? - part 17

   Let us remember that a system of dynamic pre-temporal items must assume that counterfactuals are independent of God’s knowledge, determined and finalized in time by the future choices and creatures they reflect. This is the logical assumption if we take into account the goals of this system. One deduction to be made in light of all this is that God’s choice between these contingent realities is not genuine if they do not exist objectively to Him. In the Dynamic Pre-Temporal system it seems that God chose the best path among many, the way in which He would be most glorified, therefore we must conclude that God could not have chosen to do otherwise because no potential future could exist (in time or otherwise) which God had decided not to choose. If He had generated or observed an alternate choice then it too must have existed as an alternate and simultaneous potential reality. Ultimately, because the Bible gives us no reason to believe that there are actual, alternate, potential realities, we finally must say that God would never have had or observed a potential reality or counterfactual which He would not finally choose.

   Like Compatibilism and Static Pre-Temporalism, Middle Knowledge and Dynamic Pre-Temporalism assert that God does know the future with certainty but Dynamic Temporalism claims that He also knows all the counterfactuals of all the choices that would potentially be made therein, even though He also knows that they most certainly will never happen. In one aspect of this scheme, counterfactuals only existed after God’s decree of the events to which they are counter. In other words, God decreed x, x+1, x+2, x+3 and so on, but then suddenly non x and non x+1 existed as their counterparts or counterfactuals. If this is true then I see two possible conclusions:

1. Those counterfactuals are imagined in the mind of God along with the events He has decreed to actually take place, but in His imagining of the counterfactual, their non-existence is necessarily decreed. So at the same time (if we can speak of it temporally) God decreed the factual which claims that Judas would betray Christ should certainly come to pas because He knew Judas’ intentions, and God decreed that the counterfactual which claims that Judas would not betray Christ would never come to pass. So the factual and counterfactual exist simultaneously as the thing decreed to happen and the thing decreed not to happen.

2. Those counterfactuals must have been generated by the future deliberation an individual would have between possible choices, thus making that individual the primary cause of the counterfactuals and the individual’s deliberation the secondary cause of the counterfactuals those deliberating desires preconceive. In other words, God decreed that Judas would betray Jesus. Immediately, the potential future wherein Judas wouldn’t betray Jesus was generated but just as immediately, it was discarded by God because He know for certain that Judas would in fact betray Christ.

   Consider the intent of the Molinistic point of view which in part, is supposed to shield God from the possible charge of being the author of evil and to establish the idea of libertarian freewill— which from their point of view allegedly establishes the creature’s liability to his Creator’s laws. I contend that if God chose to know the certain-future and the counter-future, assuming the counter-future will most certainly not occur, and the certain-future is a thought in the mind of God which would be chosen over the other, thus causing the counter-future to be discarded, then the counter-future has no real potential from God’s point of view, rendering it inert, unviable, and absolutely unnecessary. This appears to suggest that God has discarded one of His thoughts and kept another. If so, then the thought discarded must have been inferior in some way. Or it was simply discarded because it didn’t agree with the actual future choices men were going to make. In which case, the perfection of God’s knowledge of the future, free choices of men is challenged. And in the former case, it is an attack on the perfection and immutability of God.

If God had allowed or ordained the existence of a real counter-future or counterfactuals along with His ordinance of the certain-future, then the argument for libertarian free will is also lost and the proponent of such a theory would have to face the` same criticisms he makes of the compatibilist: why is God not the author of evil if He even allows a future wherein men are capable of choosing to do evil things and if God exists then why is there evil? Also if the counterfactuals are known in the mind of God, then creatures still do not actually posses the power of contrary choice; they cannot do otherwise because God perfectly knows even the choice they didn’t or wouldn’t make. If God knew of our choices ahead of time, no matter what the number of possible alternative counter-futures, then He still has to answer to the same objection normally posed to the Compatibilist—Is man free if he could not have chosen otherwise? If God created the tree of the knowledge of good and evil knowing that Adam certainly would sin and take the fruit and yet He created it anyway. The Molinist is then subject to the same criticism that is leveled here. I suppose that is one of the reasons Pinnock (who was formerly a professor at Westminster) has become an open theist. He is honest enough to admit the futility of the middle knowledge model. If the counterfactuals are conceived of in the mind of God, then He is not protected for being the author of evil, as the Molinist would count that protection. So in order to maintain consistency within the Molinist’s own system, God cannot be the creator or the source of these alternate outcomes; therefore they must find their source elsewhere, and the only other place is in the creature that chooses. But this demands that the knowledge of the future choices of creatures that did not yet subsist, exist before the creatures that are necessary for the decree as ordinances of the future choices. This situation is as impossible as a shadow without a substance; a reflection without an object to be reflected. Listen to one modern day Molinist as he identifies this necessity.

   “According to Molinists, God uses his knowledge of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom which are contingent and prevolitional in deciding which persons to create in which situations. But if such counterfactuals are contingent, they might not have been true. Who then, makes them true? Or to phrase the question more carefully: Who or what actually causes the ones that are true to be true, and the ones that are false to be false? In whose actual activity are we to find adequate metaphysical grounds for such truths...Could God be the one who by himself causes their truth? Clearly not. The truths in question are supposed to be true prior to, and hence independent of God’s will. To suggest that God can decide which such counterfactuals are to be true is to abandon the libertarian standpoint essential to Molinism. ”

   If counterfactuals exist outside of God, or they are not thoughts generated in the mind of God then He is ultimately subject to them (even if their number is infinite). He must observe them from a point completely disconnected from them and their creation. The only other option is to conclude that these counterfactuals or the counter-future exists in eternity past because of the deliberation of potential individuals in the yet written future. They exist simply because they might possibly happen in the future. Imagine that the degree to which there are differing numbers of possible choices a person could make regarding a certain decision, there are that many (however slight) different strands of potential realities resulting from the possibility of each choice being made in time. Imagine eternity past before the foundations of the world: Father, Son, Holy Spirit…and the extemporal, ethereal sets of potential realities—sounds absurd but is that not what is being offered as an alternative to the biblical understanding of the providence of God and the problem of evil? A scenario wherein God knows all the potential realities does not make Him more sovereign, but in fact it denies His sovereignty altogether because that being is made subject to the future and His choices—yes even election—are conditioned upon the preexistence of potential outcomes that He must observe, not determine.

God's Knowledge, Who Can Know it? - part 16

While there are a great many interesting views to consider as one ponders eternity, the time-space continuum and the like, in the end a Star Trek epistemology makes for a very poor filter through which to sift one’s theology. On the whole we Americans anyway are so inclined to reject the science for the fiction, the substance for the shadow, ignore the archetype for the type, and praise the ad rather than the product. Just look at the way most television commercials are presented. The reason we come away saying, “That was a great ad but I don’t remember what they were advertising” is because we associate more with the vehicle than its occupants. In an environment where short attention spans are expected, we can see why no one wants to invest the time it takes to really appreciate the product when they can simply enjoy the 30-second advertisement, which often has nothing to do with it. Think of the modernistic movement in painting and other fine arts where the whole philosophy backing it was to display the media at the expense of the composition and content; it was an exercise in communicating nothing through something; even though it did actually communicate something by the absence of content. One example would be Lichtenstein’s “brush stroke”. The idea that was regarded as important was not the thoughts communicated but the tools that were used in communication. Maybe this is one reason why churchgoers are happy to sacrifice good theological lyrics just for a musical style they enjoy better, a variation on the idea of form over content. It happens with preaching as well, often the thing regarded as more important is the homiletically palatable approach rather than the theology communicated in the process. It was architect Mies Van der Rohe who popularized the phrase: form follows function. The function of an object is what must ultimately determine its form. In applying this format to preaching the Word of God we can see that the homiletics of the presentation should be determined by the theology that needs to be communicated from the Word. If there is a dispute between the two then the function of The Word must win out over the form of homiletic style. I admit that I am guilty of all these errors as well. Even in the senior thesis I did for my bachelor’s degree in furniture design I emphasized the process more than the product rendered. Look also at the “Emergent Church” movement wherein the journey is what is emphasized, not the place you might end up. If you set a goal…you may not reach it, and who wants to be considered a failure for not having reached their goals? You may object by saying that this is strictly utilitarian, but I’m not suggesting that we forego aesthetics for use, or emotional pleading for accurate reading, or journey for destination—no, we must have both. Yes, we must have the object but we must also have the reflection, we must have the end but we must also employ means to get there. We must have both content and form. They must work in concert, but the thing depicting must not jealously usurp the authority if the thing which it depicts.

God's Knowledge, Who Can Know it? - part 15

Continuing on, option three above asserts that God knows the future events that will most certainly happen, but He also knows all the counterfactuals of all those events, even though He also knows that they will certainly never happen. This option also claims that those counterfactuals had existence prior to God’s decree of the events to which they are counter.  If this is true, then I see two possible conclusions:

1.        Those counterfactuals or “potential” realities must find their source in some being or some force greater than or equal to God Himself. Perhaps those beings or forces are the ones having to choose between those counterfactuals.

2.        They are self-existent.

If we assume that these realities are not generated in the mind of God, there are several problems with this idea we can see immediately. It is impossible that they would exist as an idea if the reality they shadow only exists potentially. In order for the substance of a future (that is, its cause and effect events and the beings within said future who will be making choices) to exist prior to its occurrence in time, and in order for it to be known or perceived pre-temporally, it must necessarily be a certain and not just potential future event or choice. Its pre-temporal existence is the knowledge of its future certainty as an event; in fact it is God’s knowledge of it that establishes the “gist” of its existence. And its existence as a knowable item causes it to occur at some future, temporal point. Thus there were or are now no “realities” that merely had the potential for future occurrence, only realities that possessed the certitude of future occurrence can exist as knowable futures—and even then, they are really only knowable to God unless He reveals them to His creatures in a glimpse at it were. The supposed “potential reality” can’t exist if its pre-temporal representation does not necessarily cause its existence in the future. In order for a future event to be foreseen it cannot simply be a possibility.  The thing foreseen pre-temporally is not so disjointed from its future occurrence in time. They do not exist as completely dislocated thought and reality, but the thought must be causal in relation to the reality it preconceives. It is like an object and its reflection, if you remove the object the reflection can not exist. So in that way the event foreseen is like the reflection and the event that occurs in time is the object being reflected—take away the event in time and you must also remove its reflection to be foreseen.  So the reflections do not exist theoretically from which to be chosen, they reflect a real future object, thus the reflections exist because they necessarily will occur, as they are reflecting real future objects. If they can be foreseen then they will certainly occur. Similar to the way we view the past, events that have already occurred are static just as are event that will happen in the future, and this I believe to be the orthodox Christian view. This view could therefore be referred to as “Static Pre-Temporalism”, a view that is contrasted with the Middle Knowledge or Molinistic view of real counterfactuals, which could be referred to as “Dynamic Pre-Temporalism”.

I know that Static Pre-Temporalism perhaps does not make for as good a background for entertaining science fiction as Dynamic Pre-Temporalism does, but it is the truth. I wonder if those who would reject Static Pre-Temporalism are those most influenced by a post-modern Western culture which, over the past 50 or 60 years, has been subjected to an influx of false Eastern mystical thoughts regarding time and space and reality. A ground fertilized with naturalism and primed for receiving the seeds of relativism was all too eager for the views of time, space and reality that would be popularized through shows like “Star Trek” in the 1960’s. Don’t get me wrong, I very much enjoy science fiction but it is just that…fiction tainted, some might say, by the occasional fact. It is true what they say, that truth is stranger than fiction, however, fiction is much easier to conform to our individualistic and relativistic ideals regarding reality: history and the future. We have seen this much more recently with Dan Browne’s treatment of history—most people want a history they can conform to their own ideas about how things should have been. Maybe many theologians today have contracted what I call the “Rodenberry Syndrome” (inspired by the name of the creator of “Star Trek”—Gene Rodenberry), an obsession with novelty; and the insatiable desire to “go where no man has gone before”. This is a highly dangerous activity in the realm of theology, but we can observe it in the Molinistic concept of real counterfactuals; that the future is relative to each individual’s choices.