God's Knowledge, Who Can Know it? - part 14

     Continuing from the last post wherein I discussed the first couple options, in this post I plan to take up the discussion of the Molinistic option.
There are two variations on the Molinistic theme. Below is the definition taken from Wikipedia of what a counterfactual is or may be:

“A counterfactual conditional, or subjunctive conditional, is a conditional (or “if-then”) statement indicating what would be the case if its antecedent were true. This is to be contrasted with an indicative conditional, which indicates what is (in fact) the case if its antecedent is (in fact) true.”

A counterfactual then is a statement that represents what might happen given that certain circumstances come to pass. The indicative condition is what has happened. Here are some concrete examples:

1.        If Adam had not sinned, then Christ would not have had to die on the cross. Indicative Conditional: Adam sinned and Christ had to die.

2.        If Joseph had accused Mary, then she would have been stoned. Indicative Conditional: Joseph believed the angel.

3.        If Pilate had believed, then Barabbas would have been crucified in place of Jesus. Indicative Conditional: Pilate rejected Christ and gave in to the mob’s wishes.

4.        If Judas had not betrayed Christ, then Christ would not have been arrested. Indicative Conditional: Judas betrayed Christ, and Christ was arrested.

   The Molinist concludes that, because we can conceive of such counterfactuals as these, then they must have been alternate possibilities to what has actually occurred in history. In other words, they were real possibilities representing a fork in the road of time where upon if individuals had made other choices then history would have been written differently to the degree that those other choices would have changed the outcome. Such a conclusion is only necessary in a scheme where it is presumed that creatures have the libertarian freewill to choose otherwise, meaning that persons are bound neither by any external decree or knowledge nor even by their own affections and desires as formal causal agents. We all could easily agree that the human perspective alone can look back in hindsight and claim that a different choice could have been made, but this is only true because we would be looking as finite creatures at the past. Concerning our own view of the past, which is temporally bound, it is right to affirm the existence of counterfactuals. Concerning our Creator’s view of the future, which is not temporally bound, it is right to deny the existence of counterfactuals. So we can look back at the four events mentioned above and say yes, this, that or the other thing could have happened, but as God looks at the future He would not say yes—those events are possible—unless He could not see the future perfectly. We can look back at the past and see events as they happen, but we could also imagine the contrary. So the counterfactuals we see as we look back at history are imaginary counterfactuals and can never be real or true counterfactuals. I assert that counterfactuals by nature of creation cannot be true because they do not have a ground in the decree of God. The Libertarian likely claims God decreed counterfactuals to establish freewill. But to state the Compatibilist objection positively, only those events decreed by God are actually possible ergo if God has not decreed it then it is not possible.

   In the next post I will continue this discussion.