The bible, openness, and the spaces between (continued)
Another author writes, “Middle knowledge pertains to possibilities and it comes after His decree to create.” In other words, God knows every combination and contingency fathomable. One modern-day Molinist is William Lane-Craig and this is what he had to say about that subject.
“Third, the Scriptures are replete with counterfactual statements, so that the Christian theist, at least, should be committed to the truth of certain counterfactuals about free, creaturely actions. The Church has never, until the modern age, doubted that God possesses knowledge of true counterfactuals concerning free, creaturely decisions; the whole dispute focused on whether He possessed that knowledge logically prior to the divine creative decree or only posterior to the divine decree. The Church's confidence that God knows such truths is rooted in the Scriptures themselves. To pick but one example, Paul, in reflecting upon God's eternal salvific plan realized in Christ, asserts, "None of the rulers of this age understood this; for if they had, they would not have crucified the Lord of Glory" (I Cor. 2.8). By "the rulers of this age" Paul means either the Jewish and Roman authorities such as Herod and Pilate who were the historical agents who instigated or carried out the crucifixion (cf. Acts 4. 27–28) or, more plausibly, the spiritual principalities and powers who rule "this present evil age" (Gal. 1. 4; cf. I Cor. 2. 6). In either case, we have here a counterfactual about creaturely free actions. So is Paul's assertion true or not? Will we have the temerity to say that Paul was wrong? Since the Church believes that Paul was inspired by the Holy Spirit to write these words, she accepts them as revealed truth from God. Thus, we have strong prima facie warrant for holding that there are true counterfactuals concerning what creatures would freely do under various circumstances.[i]”
We must first observe the deficiency of Craig’s exegesis of the passage. Paul’s point has nothing to do with the presumed assertion that Christ might not have been crucified. Does Craig actually mean to suggest that among the possible threads of contingencies (futurabilia), from which God chose, there existed the possible future where Christ did not have to die for the Church? Craig falsely states that the church has never doubted God’s knowledge of counterfactuals. He contends that the Church in all times prior to the modern age (which depending on who you ask, started sometime in the 1900’s) upheld his Molinistic view as orthodox; this simply is not true. The Westminster Confession of faith clearly discredits his assertion.
“I. God from all eternity, did, by the most wise and holy counsel of His own will, freely, and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass; yet so, as thereby neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures; nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established.
II. Although God knows whatsoever may or can come to pass upon all supposed conditions; [4] yet has He not decreed anything because He foresaw it as future, or as that which would come to pass upon such conditions
III. By the decree of God, for the manifestation of His glory, some men and angels are predestinated unto everlasting life; and others foreordained to everlasting death.[ii]”
The contingencies spoken of in this confession are in regards to second causes or creaturely actions. In II it is stated that God knows whatever “may or can come to pass” but the statement following (4) explicitly denies the idea of counterfactual knowledge—that God may have decreed the actual future because He foresaw all “possible” futures.
And the 1689 London Baptist Confession echoes the essence of this sentiment exactly. Craig affirms that the debate is actually the debate between him and open theists, and while it is true that the essence of Open Theism has a history that reaches far back, so also does the current denial of counterfactuals find its history rooted in Reformational theology. It is easy for one to say that Paul said X means y, so non-y is false. Don’t we find it clear that one could easily interpret Paul’s statement differently thus concluding something different? Craig fails to substantiate his interpretation here and falsely asserts that anyone taking a position contrary to his own would in fact be calling Paul a liar. If it was much more obvious that Paul, as Craig seems to think, was clearly substantiating a doctrine of counterfactuals in that passage, then Craig’s argument might have weight. But Paul’s words aren’t clearly, or even implicitly, making a case for the possibility of “futurabilia”.
[i] Lane Craig, William. “Middle Knowledge, Truth-makers, and the ‘Ground Breaking’ Objection” Article on
[ii] Westminster
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