Romans 5:7-9

For one will scarcely die for a righteous person—though perhaps for a good person one would dare even to die—but God shows his love for us in that while we were still sinners, Christ died for us. Since, therefore, we have now been justified by his blood, much more shall we be saved by him from the wrath of God.
Showing posts with label Theology: Sovereignty. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Theology: Sovereignty. Show all posts

Wednesday, October 14, 2009

God's Knowledge, Who Can Know it? - part 20

Our choices and their immediate causes


This brings us to the discussion of how we make choices and why.  I have made the assertion that, regarding the choices we make, we necessarily could not have chosen otherwise but I would like to bring the words of other men to bear on the topic. This is what John Hendrix has to say regarding our choosing Christ.
“So if there is not of necessity any moral reason or motive that ultimately compels one to believe or not then how could God blame someone for rejecting Him? To believe the gospel is a moral choice, from the heart. If not then God could not call the rejection of the gospel a sin.  If our affections do not cause us to believe then belief and unbelief is ultimately non-affectional, not from the heart and rejection could not be considered a sin.  But if it is a moral choice then how did one person get a more moral disposition than the other?  One remained proud and the other humble?  Was this by nature or by grace? If by grace then why don’t all men have it? If by nature then some people are more virtuous than others apart from grace. This dilemma is really fatal to libertarian free will and none of them have been able to answer these basic questions.  The answer ‘just because’ is not enough. [i]”
Hendrix’s words assert that our choices are made because of our affections, not in spite of them. Clearly not all non-Calvinist/non-Reformed persons espouse an anthropology of libertarian free-will nor do they all claim to adhere to philosophical systems that promote a variation on the theory of middle knowledge. Though I must that I don’t know where else thinking individuals would likely rest on the issue of God’s foreknowledge, providence and His ability to carry out His plans in time as He wishes except that they claim either of the three main views: Open Theism (Process Theology), Molinism (Middle Knowledge) or Compatibilism.
When a worldview claims libertarian free will as one of its foundational tenets, one of two things result: either it makes a belief in original sin (at least the historic, biblical understanding of the term) a contradiction within their system, or it must be denied all together.  Listen to what they say about their own system. 
“Libertarians take very seriously the widespread judgment that we are morally responsible for our actions and that moral responsibility requires freedom” That is, a person cannot be held morally responsible for an act unless he or she was free to perform that act and free to refrain from it. This is basic moral intuition.[ii]”
If responsibility, as such a one would claim, is grounded in one’s ability to have chosen “X” or non-X without any compelling influences, then we don’t inherit guilt and condemnation from Adam (as the historical, biblical understanding promotes) but instead we inherit only the capacity to sin, thus denying the doctrine of original sin.  The other result is that such a one may accept the doctrine of original sin in some superficial sense but also claim that Christ died to make all men savable in order to give everyone the capacity for choosing God, thus leading to the contradiction in their system where men both, inherit Adam’s sin and maintain the ability to choose not to sin while still “counted in Adam”. I personally like what John Owen has to say regarding this man-made philosophy, and find it difficult to state it any better.
“To suppose that whatever God requireth of us that we have power of ourselves to do, is to make the cross and grace of Jesus Christ of none effect.[iii]”
He goes on to assess the libertarian view of creaturely freedom and his responsibility in a way with which I must agree.
“The essence of this view is that a free action is one that does not have a sufficient condition or cause prior to its occurrence…the common experience of deliberation assumes that our choices are undetermined.  [iv]”
I have heard it stated very often that men only go to Hell because of their personal unbelief. If this unbelief is a sin that finds its origin in the fallen affections of the human heart, a heart whose condition was inherited from Adam, then it is biblical to say that ultimately we are guilty and go to Hell because we are inherently sinners; unbelief being one of those sins for which the unregenerate man will be punished in Hell. As a result it would be more accurate, yes even more biblical, to say that one goes to Hell because they are a sinner unredeemed, and that their unbelief is one sin among many for which they will continue to render payment in Hell as they abide God’s wrath for an eternity. So if it is not simply my unbelief that causes my damnation, then on what foundation is human responsibility based? This forces us to answer a more telling question, why do we make the choices we do? According to the Libertarian, if our choices are to be considered free (and they must be in order for God to hold us responsible for them, according to the Libertarian) then they can have no determining factor, no sufficient condition or cause at all—not even our affections or desires are allowed to cause our choices, not even they are the antecedent cause for what we choose. But Libertarianism and Dynamic Pre-Temporalism do not establish culpability for our choices instead they absolve us of being responsible for the things we do. Rationality leads us to believe that the contrary is true, that only if our choices are born out of our desires can we be held responsible for those choices. As Hendrix stated before, if our choices are not born out of our desires and affections then it would be unfair for God to judge us by them. Here is Hendrix again on this topic.
“The Belief in Libertarian Free Will Destroys Moral Responsibility – Walls and Dongell make a strong case that our judicial system is based on the commonsense view of libertarian freedom since the lawyers often defend the degree of guilt of clients based on whether they were coerced, their upbringing, emotional state and the like.  These kind of conditions indeed often make people less culpable if their inability made them so they could not have done otherwise. If criminals could have made different choices than they did, i.e. if they were coerced into making a bad choice, then we all agree they would not be as legally responsible for their crime.  While it is true that coercion often plays a role in the legal degree of punishment, but this only scratches the surface of the matter. Consider the opposite that if criminals just chose to commit a crime but had no intent or motives for it at all then the lawyer would be forced to plead insanity for his client before the court. If the choice to commit a crime were not based and caused ultimately on a reason, desire or motive then he would have to be absolved from guilt because he would not be responsible for it. If one chose to murder someone simply because he chose to it would be a sign of sickness not responsibility. Libertarian free will, therefore, destroys responsibility.  Moral responsibility exists, not in spite of, but because our choices have reasons, motives, intent. Only the determinist, therefore, upholds moral responsibility. Can we be held responsible for doing something we do not want to do? [v]”
So we conclude that if our choices are not rooted in our natural affections, then God cannot hold us responsible for them because those choices would be arbitrary, thus making God’s judgment of them capricious. The only other option is that the choices we make are in fact rooted in our desires just as the proverb suggests (4:23).



[i] Hendryx, J. W. 'Just Because':  Eleven (11) Reasons to Reject Libertarian Free Will. Same source as  endnote number 3.
[ii] Walls, Jerry L, and Dongell, Joseph R. Why I am not a Calvinist. (InterVarsity Press, 2004)
[iii] Owen, John III: 433
[iv] Ibid.
[v] Hendryx, J. W. 'Just Because':  Eleven (11) Reasons to Reject Libertarian Free Will. Same source as endnote number 3.


Monday, October 12, 2009

God's Knowledge, Who Can Know it? - part 19

Preexistent potential realities?


In summary, I have divided into four categories the most likely views regarding the pre-temporal knowledge of and existence of future events and choices:
1.        A being greater than God created multiple, potential sets of realties from which Yahweh God must choose, yet Yahweh God knows all the events that would have taken place had He chosen otherwise.
a.        Explanation: This view is manifestly non-Christian. However it does make great science fiction. Logically though, if there existed a being greater (this other being has created potential realities from which Yahweh God must choose, thus making him greater) than the God of the Christian Scriptures, then that being would by definition, be God and the being to whom he submitted sets of potential realities from which to choose is a lesser being and, also by definition, could not be God—at least not the Creator God described in the Bible. The lesser being may not have been created by the being that generated the potential realities, but then again, the being that did may have created both of them, who knows? In other words, the being that created the possible realities is necessarily greater than the one who chooses from them, and the being who chooses becomes a non-God because he is subject to some force outside Himself that influences his choices.
2.        God conceived of multiple, potential sets of realities and then He chose from them. These sets exist only as thoughts until chosen, and in process, realized. They only exist in the first place because God has thought of them as potential realities. In effect God says I might do this, yet I might do this other thing—God considered what I would do and made His choice based on what He knew I would choose.
a.        Explanation: This view possibility challenges the perfection and wisdom of God.  The implication of this is, if God thought of two possible futures and chose to implement one into reality and not the other, and then the one discarded is inferior by virtue of its being discarded. That, in my opinion, is an untenable thought regarding anything God does. If one possible future was chosen above another then it must have been for the reason that it is better future in some way and to some degree, however insignificant the difference may be. If the choice is not made based on the intrinsic superior value of one potentiality above the other, then it must be based on exclusively on God’s knowledge of his creature’s future choices or else His choice must be considered arbitrary—that would be an attack on the purposefulness of God. If the former is true then God is ultimately subject to the power of the future choices that He knows His creatures will make. If the latter is true then God’s goodness would have to be called into question. God must act or choose with purpose in order to maintain His righteous character. To choose without purpose is in essence to choose without knowledge—and choosing without knowledge is something that is not possible with God, unless of course you are an Open Theist. God is by definition, all-knowing. If God knows everything past, present and future then His choices must be in accordance with that knowledge or else He would be making a decision against what He knows to be best. Even for creatures, a choice made with knowledge has at least that much purpose. Thus God’s choices made in perfect knowledge are perfect also in their purpose.
3.        Multiple sets of potential realities exist as a result of the mere possibility of their future realization through the choices made by possible creatures within each set. God must chose from those sets and the one He chooses becomes real as time goes on.
a.        Explanation: If these alternate thoughts from which God must choose were not from His own mind, then from whose mind did they come?  In the case of the possible strands of realities (futurabilia as Molina called them), it must be concluded that the generative source or sources of these strands were the thoughts, choices, and determinations of the subjects within the strands themselves.  And if this is so then the subjects had no objective primary cause—rendering them causes which in effect, cause themselves! In due course, one must draw the same conclusion here as with the previous view.
4.        God’s singular set of decrees lead to His creation, which includes the ends and the means to these ends (all creatures and their thoughts, choices, and actions are obviously included).
a.        Explanation: If this view is true, then there can be no other possible outcomes.  This view, referred to as Compatibilism, Reformed, or Static Pre-Temporalism as I have dubbed some of its specific aspects, I believe is the biblical model.




Friday, October 9, 2009

God's Knowledge, Who Can Know it? - part 18

   Many believers would oppose Open Theism when presented with its heresies by affirming that God does has perfect knowledge of the future, but it is only the Compatibilist who rightly says that God’s knowledge of and decree of future events and choices are inseparably related. Therefore the future, which God sees perfectly, finds its source in all of that which God desires to take place; not withstanding that God may desire one thing above another and may exhibit varying degrees of affection toward different things. And as I said before, I do not think that the Molinistic scheme actually accomplishes that which it is attempting to accomplish, namely that God is protected from being the ultimate cause of evil simply because real counterfactuals exist. If God knows perfectly the future choice that a man will make, if God knows that I will turn right at the light, then do I legitimately have the power of contrary choice, could I actually choose to turn left? The answer is no, of course not. Even if the potential reality that represented my choice to turn left did exist, God knew that I wouldn’t.

Wednesday, October 7, 2009

God's Knowledge, Who Can Know it? - part 17

   Let us remember that a system of dynamic pre-temporal items must assume that counterfactuals are independent of God’s knowledge, determined and finalized in time by the future choices and creatures they reflect. This is the logical assumption if we take into account the goals of this system. One deduction to be made in light of all this is that God’s choice between these contingent realities is not genuine if they do not exist objectively to Him. In the Dynamic Pre-Temporal system it seems that God chose the best path among many, the way in which He would be most glorified, therefore we must conclude that God could not have chosen to do otherwise because no potential future could exist (in time or otherwise) which God had decided not to choose. If He had generated or observed an alternate choice then it too must have existed as an alternate and simultaneous potential reality. Ultimately, because the Bible gives us no reason to believe that there are actual, alternate, potential realities, we finally must say that God would never have had or observed a potential reality or counterfactual which He would not finally choose.
   Like Compatibilism and Static Pre-Temporalism, Middle Knowledge and Dynamic Pre-Temporalism assert that God does know the future with certainty but Dynamic Temporalism claims that He also knows all the counterfactuals of all the choices that would potentially be made therein, even though He also knows that they most certainly will never happen. In one aspect of this scheme, counterfactuals only existed after God’s decree of the events to which they are counter. In other words, God decreed x, x+1, x+2, x+3 and so on, but then suddenly non x and non x+1 existed as their counterparts or counterfactuals. If this is true then I see two possible conclusions:
1. Those counterfactuals are imagined in the mind of God along with the events He has decreed to actually take place, but in His imagining of the counterfactual, their non-existence is necessarily decreed. So at the same time (if we can speak of it temporally) God decreed the factual which claims that Judas would betray Christ should certainly come to pas because He knew Judas’ intentions, and God decreed that the counterfactual which claims that Judas would not betray Christ would never come to pass. So the factual and counterfactual exist simultaneously as the thing decreed to happen and the thing decreed not to happen.
2. Those counterfactuals must have been generated by the future deliberation an individual would have between possible choices, thus making that individual the primary cause of the counterfactuals and the individual’s deliberation the secondary cause of the counterfactuals those deliberating desires preconceive. In other words, God decreed that Judas would betray Jesus. Immediately, the potential future wherein Judas wouldn’t betray Jesus was generated but just as immediately, it was discarded by God because He know for certain that Judas would in fact betray Christ.
   Consider the intent of the Molinistic point of view which in part, is supposed to shield God from the possible charge of being the author of evil and to establish the idea of libertarian freewill— which from their point of view allegedly establishes the creature’s liability to his Creator’s laws. I contend that if God chose to know the certain-future and the counter-future, assuming the counter-future will most certainly not occur, and the certain-future is a thought in the mind of God which would be chosen over the other, thus causing the counter-future to be discarded, then the counter-future has no real potential from God’s point of view, rendering it inert, unviable, and absolutely unnecessary. This appears to suggest that God has discarded one of His thoughts and kept another. If so, then the thought discarded must have been inferior in some way. Or it was simply discarded because it didn’t agree with the actual future choices men were going to make. In which case, the perfection of God’s knowledge of the future, free choices of men is challenged. And in the former case, it is an attack on the perfection and immutability of God.
If God had allowed or ordained the existence of a real counter-future or counterfactuals along with His ordinance of the certain-future, then the argument for libertarian free will is also lost and the proponent of such a theory would have to face the` same criticisms he makes of the compatibilist: why is God not the author of evil if He even allows a future wherein men are capable of choosing to do evil things and if God exists then why is there evil? Also if the counterfactuals are known in the mind of God, then creatures still do not actually posses the power of contrary choice; they cannot do otherwise because God perfectly knows even the choice they didn’t or wouldn’t make. If God knew of our choices ahead of time, no matter what the number of possible alternative counter-futures, then He still has to answer to the same objection normally posed to the Compatibilist—Is man free if he could not have chosen otherwise? If God created the tree of the knowledge of good and evil knowing that Adam certainly would sin and take the fruit and yet He created it anyway. The Molinist is then subject to the same criticism that is leveled here. I suppose that is one of the reasons Pinnock (who was formerly a professor at Westminster) has become an open theist. He is honest enough to admit the futility of the middle knowledge model. If the counterfactuals are conceived of in the mind of God, then He is not protected for being the author of evil, as the Molinist would count that protection. So in order to maintain consistency within the Molinist’s own system, God cannot be the creator or the source of these alternate outcomes; therefore they must find their source elsewhere, and the only other place is in the creature that chooses. But this demands that the knowledge of the future choices of creatures that did not yet subsist, exist before the creatures that are necessary for the decree as ordinances of the future choices. This situation is as impossible as a shadow without a substance; a reflection without an object to be reflected. Listen to one modern day Molinist as he identifies this necessity.
   “According to Molinists, God uses his knowledge of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom which are contingent and prevolitional in deciding which persons to create in which situations. But if such counterfactuals are contingent, they might not have been true. Who then, makes them true? Or to phrase the question more carefully: Who or what actually causes the ones that are true to be true, and the ones that are false to be false? In whose actual activity are we to find adequate metaphysical grounds for such truths...Could God be the one who by himself causes their truth? Clearly not. The truths in question are supposed to be true prior to, and hence independent of God’s will. To suggest that God can decide which such counterfactuals are to be true is to abandon the libertarian standpoint essential to Molinism. ”
   If counterfactuals exist outside of God, or they are not thoughts generated in the mind of God then He is ultimately subject to them (even if their number is infinite). He must observe them from a point completely disconnected from them and their creation. The only other option is to conclude that these counterfactuals or the counter-future exists in eternity past because of the deliberation of potential individuals in the yet written future. They exist simply because they might possibly happen in the future. Imagine that the degree to which there are differing numbers of possible choices a person could make regarding a certain decision, there are that many (however slight) different strands of potential realities resulting from the possibility of each choice being made in time. Imagine eternity past before the foundations of the world: Father, Son, Holy Spirit…and the extemporal, ethereal sets of potential realities—sounds absurd but is that not what is being offered as an alternative to the biblical understanding of the providence of God and the problem of evil? A scenario wherein God knows all the potential realities does not make Him more sovereign, but in fact it denies His sovereignty altogether because that being is made subject to the future and His choices—yes even election—are conditioned upon the preexistence of potential outcomes that He must observe, not determine.

Monday, October 5, 2009

God's Knowledge, Who Can Know it? - part 16

While there are a great many interesting views to consider as one ponders eternity, the time-space continuum and the like, in the end a Star Trek epistemology makes for a very poor filter through which to sift one’s theology. On the whole we Americans anyway are so inclined to reject the science for the fiction, the substance for the shadow, ignore the archetype for the type, and praise the ad rather than the product. Just look at the way most television commercials are presented. The reason we come away saying, “That was a great ad but I don’t remember what they were advertising” is because we associate more with the vehicle than its occupants. In an environment where short attention spans are expected, we can see why no one wants to invest the time it takes to really appreciate the product when they can simply enjoy the 30-second advertisement, which often has nothing to do with it. Think of the modernistic movement in painting and other fine arts where the whole philosophy backing it was to display the media at the expense of the composition and content; it was an exercise in communicating nothing through something; even though it did actually communicate something by the absence of content. One example would be Lichtenstein’s “brush stroke”. The idea that was regarded as important was not the thoughts communicated but the tools that were used in communication. Maybe this is one reason why churchgoers are happy to sacrifice good theological lyrics just for a musical style they enjoy better, a variation on the idea of form over content. It happens with preaching as well, often the thing regarded as more important is the homiletically palatable approach rather than the theology communicated in the process. It was architect Mies Van der Rohe who popularized the phrase: form follows function. The function of an object is what must ultimately determine its form. In applying this format to preaching the Word of God we can see that the homiletics of the presentation should be determined by the theology that needs to be communicated from the Word. If there is a dispute between the two then the function of The Word must win out over the form of homiletic style. I admit that I am guilty of all these errors as well. Even in the senior thesis I did for my bachelor’s degree in furniture design I emphasized the process more than the product rendered. Look also at the “Emergent Church” movement wherein the journey is what is emphasized, not the place you might end up. If you set a goal…you may not reach it, and who wants to be considered a failure for not having reached their goals? You may object by saying that this is strictly utilitarian, but I’m not suggesting that we forego aesthetics for use, or emotional pleading for accurate reading, or journey for destination—no, we must have both. Yes, we must have the object but we must also have the reflection, we must have the end but we must also employ means to get there. We must have both content and form. They must work in concert, but the thing depicting must not jealously usurp the authority if the thing which it depicts.

Friday, October 2, 2009

God's Knowledge, Who Can Know it? - part 15

Continuing on, option three above asserts that God knows the future events that will most certainly happen, but He also knows all the counterfactuals of all those events, even though He also knows that they will certainly never happen. This option also claims that those counterfactuals had existence prior to God’s decree of the events to which they are counter.  If this is true, then I see two possible conclusions:
1.        Those counterfactuals or “potential” realities must find their source in some being or some force greater than or equal to God Himself. Perhaps those beings or forces are the ones having to choose between those counterfactuals.
2.        They are self-existent.
If we assume that these realities are not generated in the mind of God, there are several problems with this idea we can see immediately. It is impossible that they would exist as an idea if the reality they shadow only exists potentially. In order for the substance of a future (that is, its cause and effect events and the beings within said future who will be making choices) to exist prior to its occurrence in time, and in order for it to be known or perceived pre-temporally, it must necessarily be a certain and not just potential future event or choice. Its pre-temporal existence is the knowledge of its future certainty as an event; in fact it is God’s knowledge of it that establishes the “gist” of its existence. And its existence as a knowable item causes it to occur at some future, temporal point. Thus there were or are now no “realities” that merely had the potential for future occurrence, only realities that possessed the certitude of future occurrence can exist as knowable futures—and even then, they are really only knowable to God unless He reveals them to His creatures in a glimpse at it were. The supposed “potential reality” can’t exist if its pre-temporal representation does not necessarily cause its existence in the future. In order for a future event to be foreseen it cannot simply be a possibility.  The thing foreseen pre-temporally is not so disjointed from its future occurrence in time. They do not exist as completely dislocated thought and reality, but the thought must be causal in relation to the reality it preconceives. It is like an object and its reflection, if you remove the object the reflection can not exist. So in that way the event foreseen is like the reflection and the event that occurs in time is the object being reflected—take away the event in time and you must also remove its reflection to be foreseen.  So the reflections do not exist theoretically from which to be chosen, they reflect a real future object, thus the reflections exist because they necessarily will occur, as they are reflecting real future objects. If they can be foreseen then they will certainly occur. Similar to the way we view the past, events that have already occurred are static just as are event that will happen in the future, and this I believe to be the orthodox Christian view. This view could therefore be referred to as “Static Pre-Temporalism”, a view that is contrasted with the Middle Knowledge or Molinistic view of real counterfactuals, which could be referred to as “Dynamic Pre-Temporalism”.
I know that Static Pre-Temporalism perhaps does not make for as good a background for entertaining science fiction as Dynamic Pre-Temporalism does, but it is the truth. I wonder if those who would reject Static Pre-Temporalism are those most influenced by a post-modern Western culture which, over the past 50 or 60 years, has been subjected to an influx of false Eastern mystical thoughts regarding time and space and reality. A ground fertilized with naturalism and primed for receiving the seeds of relativism was all too eager for the views of time, space and reality that would be popularized through shows like “Star Trek” in the 1960’s. Don’t get me wrong, I very much enjoy science fiction but it is just that…fiction tainted, some might say, by the occasional fact. It is true what they say, that truth is stranger than fiction, however, fiction is much easier to conform to our individualistic and relativistic ideals regarding reality: history and the future. We have seen this much more recently with Dan Browne’s treatment of history—most people want a history they can conform to their own ideas about how things should have been. Maybe many theologians today have contracted what I call the “Rodenberry Syndrome” (inspired by the name of the creator of “Star Trek”—Gene Rodenberry), an obsession with novelty; and the insatiable desire to “go where no man has gone before”. This is a highly dangerous activity in the realm of theology, but we can observe it in the Molinistic concept of real counterfactuals; that the future is relative to each individual’s choices.

Wednesday, September 30, 2009

God's Knowledge, Who Can Know it? - part 14

     Continuing from the last post wherein I discussed the first couple options, in this post I plan to take up the discussion of the Molinistic option.
There are two variations on the Molinistic theme. Below is the definition taken from Wikipedia of what a counterfactual is or may be:
“A counterfactual conditional, or subjunctive conditional, is a conditional (or “if-then”) statement indicating what would be the case if its antecedent were true. This is to be contrasted with an indicative conditional, which indicates what is (in fact) the case if its antecedent is (in fact) true.”
A counterfactual then is a statement that represents what might happen given that certain circumstances come to pass. The indicative condition is what has happened. Here are some concrete examples:
1.        If Adam had not sinned, then Christ would not have had to die on the cross. Indicative Conditional: Adam sinned and Christ had to die.
2.        If Joseph had accused Mary, then she would have been stoned. Indicative Conditional: Joseph believed the angel.
3.        If Pilate had believed, then Barabbas would have been crucified in place of Jesus. Indicative Conditional: Pilate rejected Christ and gave in to the mob’s wishes.
4.        If Judas had not betrayed Christ, then Christ would not have been arrested. Indicative Conditional: Judas betrayed Christ, and Christ was arrested.
   The Molinist concludes that, because we can conceive of such counterfactuals as these, then they must have been alternate possibilities to what has actually occurred in history. In other words, they were real possibilities representing a fork in the road of time where upon if individuals had made other choices then history would have been written differently to the degree that those other choices would have changed the outcome. Such a conclusion is only necessary in a scheme where it is presumed that creatures have the libertarian freewill to choose otherwise, meaning that persons are bound neither by any external decree or knowledge nor even by their own affections and desires as formal causal agents. We all could easily agree that the human perspective alone can look back in hindsight and claim that a different choice could have been made, but this is only true because we would be looking as finite creatures at the past. Concerning our own view of the past, which is temporally bound, it is right to affirm the existence of counterfactuals. Concerning our Creator’s view of the future, which is not temporally bound, it is right to deny the existence of counterfactuals. So we can look back at the four events mentioned above and say yes, this, that or the other thing could have happened, but as God looks at the future He would not say yes—those events are possible—unless He could not see the future perfectly. We can look back at the past and see events as they happen, but we could also imagine the contrary. So the counterfactuals we see as we look back at history are imaginary counterfactuals and can never be real or true counterfactuals. I assert that counterfactuals by nature of creation cannot be true because they do not have a ground in the decree of God. The Libertarian likely claims God decreed counterfactuals to establish freewill. But to state the Compatibilist objection positively, only those events decreed by God are actually possible ergo if God has not decreed it then it is not possible.
   In the next post I will continue this discussion.

Monday, September 28, 2009

God's Knowledge, Who Can Know it? - part 13

Continuing now with the discussion of the options I listed at the end of the last post.

Option one is the testimony of Open Theism. Sometimes referred to as “Process Theology”, the proponents of this position attest that God cannot know the future choices of his creatures or else those choices are not free.  If He did know the future choices of His creatures then they necessarily would not be free because they could not then have chosen otherwise. 
Option two is the Reformed opinion. This understanding of how God knows and interacts with time and the future, as stated before, is sometimes referred to as “Compatibilism”. The Compatibilist says that God’s creatures are free to make choices according to their desires—and in fact must do so in order for those choices to really be free.  We also maintain that God’s decree of an event to bring ultimate good and man’s plan to sin in the very same event are compatible, so that the resulting consequences may accomplish both of those ends: man’s sinful ones and God’s holy ones. Consider Joseph’s brothers selling him into slavery in the book of Genesis. 
   Option three is far more involved, thus requiring a far greater amount of discussion.thus I will begin that discussion next post.

Friday, September 25, 2009

God's Knowledge, Who Can Know it? - part 12

Counterfactuals: fact or fiction?

For the sake of argument let’s assume for a moment that God does know my future choice perfectly. The reason God knows is not because He simply foresees it in the future, for unless my choice has previously been conceived, it does not exist in order to be foreseen. The Reformed explanation for this is that God knows my future choice (and all things that will happen) because He has ordained or decreed them. God does not see future events as truths generated externally from His knowledge; His knowledge of them is their final causal agent. In our apprehension of God and His decrees, as lofty a topic as it most certainly is, we might be able to say that His knowledge of future creaturely choices and temporal events is dependant upon His decree of them. In other words, He knows them because He planned them and the certainty of their existence because He knows them. But who conceives of my future choice: God, myself, or are they self-existent? If ultimate objectivity exists then it must embodied in the existence of a being of the immutable perfection pf a personal Creator who relates to His creatures in covenantal fashion. The components of such objectivity are: the written future, ethical standards, time, truth and the like. The God of the Christian scriptures is that being and because He created, that which He has created is subject to Him and is dependant upon His continued existence. No right thinking individual would argue that God didn’t create, and because He did then He necessarily must have decreed or planned to do so. If He had only created one angelic being then the logical inference is that, prior to that creation, He had decreed or planned to do so. It is an intellectual end-run to suggest that, in order to maintain a creature’s freedom and establish its blameworthiness, God could only know all the choices and actions of that creature without having decreed or planned them. To deny such does not mean that God is the immediate cause of those actions or choices (the creature is) but it does indicate that they are a means to His ends. If this is rejected then God personally could not have a purpose in the future actions and choices of that creature. God’s holiness in part, rests on whether or not He did create with a purpose. If He did not decree or plan for everything that exists, then His purposefulness in those things that happen and exist is called into question. Their existence becomes a means only of establishing the creature’s freedom. Moreover, if one could establish that God had created any one thing or that any one event happened outside of His decree, plan or purpose, then I believe that we could gather that He has (God forbid) done something unethical. Professing Christians at least ought to agree that if a being has committed an unethical act then He could not be perfect or holy and therefore could not be God.  In other words, if there was no plan or decree of the creature and its subsequent actions formed prior to its creation, then the purposefulness of its creation is challenged. And I would argue that if anything happened or anything exists without God investing purpose in it, then God couldn’t exist. If there was a purposeless event then it must have happened, not by God’s creation, ordination, or decree, but randomly, thus outside of the purview of God’s hand—rendering Him impotent. 
In contrast, one might suggest that God created the natural realm yet many of the events and choices contained therein were not directly decreed but may occur “naturally” within that realm and the assurance of the future existence of said events and choices is finally caused by their antecedents that God is responsible for having decreed, thus exonerating God as the potential author of evil. Even if this suggestion were true, it does not apply to my premise because, though God is not the imminent cause of every event and choice, His decree is their final cause due to the fact that He created the realm in which these things take place therefore no event or choice is random or purposeless. I submit that God did decree all things directly, but He did not cause them all directly.  He decreed all things directly but uses secondary causes to reach His intended ends, having ordained both the ends and their means. 
God knew all that would occur before His first act of creation. He knew that one third of all the angels would fall into sin under the deception of Lucifer; He knew that Adam would fall by eating of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, but how did God know? God could not have known perfectly what would happen if He hadn’t decreed it. If God knew evil would exist yet He hadn’t decreed it and He created anyway, then evil ultimately has no purpose. If purposeless, gratuitous evil exists then God cannot exist. William Rowe explains gratuitous evil this way, “…not necessary for the occurrence of any greater good or the prevention of any equally bad or worse evil.[i]”
The open theist adopts such a view of evil. They claim that investing God’s purpose in evil events creates the very problem of evil, and that He can have no purpose in it or else His is not holy. Listen to what John Sanders has to say.
“The accident that caused the death of my brother was a tragedy. God does not have a specific purpose in mind for [this] occurrence…there is no point for the specific occurrence of gratuitous evil.[ii]”
But I say, without a point, God cannot exist. Hence the criticism of the Open Theist’s position that, in its attempt to solve the problem of evil they make God in the image of man. Where else would evil find its purpose if God didn’t ordain it; could God have created a universe devoid of evil, He obviously didn’t. And if it was possible and He didn’t create that universe then why do we still regard Him as holy and omnipotent?  Did God have to create at all? God did have to create in order for His perfection to issue forth causing praise. As John Piper puts it, “Creation is God’s glory gone public.” It was necessary for God to create and He did so in order that His magnificence would be displayed through the joy His creatures received when they magnify His glory. So God decided to create, of that one thing we can be sure. So, regarding future events, creaturely choices and the like, there really are only three choices, either:
1.        God learns the future as His creatures make choices.
2.        God ordains all things: the ends and the means to those ends.
3.        God knows what will occur in the future, including the future choices of His creatures but real counterfactuals exist that represent what His creatures might have done but didn’t.  These counterfactuals come into existence either prior to or after God’s decrees, depending on who you ask.

In the following post I plan to discuss the three options above.


[i] Rowe, William.                Howard-Snyder, 116
[ii] Sanders, John E. The God Who Risks. (Intervarsity Press, 1998)

Wednesday, September 23, 2009

God's Knowledge, Who Can Know it? - part 11


In addition to the information presented in the last post, there are several other implications to be drawn.

1.        God perfectly knows my future choice therefore my choice is, from God’s perspective, determined before I make it.

2.        Because God has perfect knowledge of future events and choices, He necessarily must have decreed their occurrence.

3.        God perfectly knows my future choice therefore I can’t choose against His decree.

4.        God perfectly knows my future choice therefore I can’t choose differently. Refer back to number seven above.

5.        If my choice is not predetermined then God cannot know my future choice perfectly. The denial of this is what has caused some to comply with Open Theism. Refer back to number six above.

6.        If I can choose against the decree of God then He doesn’t actually know my future choice and thus has not decreed it.

7.        If I can choose differently then God doesn’t know my future choice perfectly.

Monday, September 21, 2009

God's Knowledge, Who Can Know it? - part 10


Eight revealing questions (continued with questions 5-8)

5.        What factors determine or cause my choice?  In answering this question I’ve decided to employ Aristotle’s “Four Causes”.  I mentioned two types of causes in my earlier example: efficient and formal, and here I will provide further explanation of those causes. The four causes are these: material, efficient, formal, and final, and I will apply them to the example above wherein I chose to turn right. The material causes of my choice were things like, the road, my car, and me.  The efficient causes of my choice to turn right were my destination, the “T” intersection, and the car-jacker. The formal cause of my choice was my motivation: my desire to turn right (born out of my affections) and my consideration of the efficiency of my travel; do I take the fastest route to my destination or the shortest route? And the final cause of my choice to turn right was God’s decree that I would in the future, most definitely turn right.
6.        Thus another question arises, the one pertaining most to the topic at hand, could I actually have chosen differently? In answering this question it is helpful to consider the causes of my choice. Would the material causes of my choice to turn right prohibit me from turning left? The existence of the road wouldn’t prohibit my turning left. The fact that I was in a car would not prohibit me from turning left. My own existence would not preclude my turning left. So what about the efficient cause: by turning either left or right I might have reached my destination. Even if turning left was a dead-end, I could make a u-turn and finally get to my destination. The fact that I was at a “T” intersection when I turned right did not limit my choice to only going right.  I still could have turned left. I even could have gone straight if I had been willing to run off the road. Even if a car-jacker demanding me to turn a direction other than I had intended, doesn’t necessitate that I make that choice. I may choose to go the direction I originally had intended, even if it is at my own peril. Next we explore the formal cause of my turning right.  Primarily, the formal cause of my choice to turn right was my motivation, but the secondary formal cause was either, the fastest way to arrive at my destination or the shortest way to my destination. Even so, neither of these hindered my choice absolutely. So during the examination of all these different causes of my turning right we find that, from the human, temporal perspective I could have turned left but in hindsight we must agree that my choice was fixed and because I chose to turn right we must deduce that I could not have chosen otherwise because of the final cause of my choice. The final cause of my choice to turn right was not just my desire and affection to that direction but ultimately I could not have chosen otherwise because God decreed for it to happen. Yes, God knew it was going to happen. If He knew I might turn right but I actually ended up turning left then His knowledge would have been imperfect.  So the answer to the question, could I actually have chosen differently is no. Because God’s knowledge of the future is perfect I could not have chosen differently. The final two questions are difficult to separate from the last one, and from one another, but I’ll give it a shot.
7.        Can I choose against the decree of God?  Well, if I have argued effectively in the last several sentences then we will see that the answer to this question is also no, and for the very same reasons.  If we are able to choose contrary to the decree of God then He would no longer be God because He would be rendered impotent and without knowledge. The nature of His decree is that it certainly comes to pass.
8.        And the last question is this: was my choice determined? The answer is inevitably, if we’re honest, yes.  If God knows what He knows perfectly and those things He knows includes my choices, then my choices necessarily are predetermined. But the reality that I can’t choose against God’s decree doesn’t mean that my choices aren’t real. My choices are real precisely because I don’t know God’s decree beforehand. In essence, if being a creature means in part, not knowing my own future and my freedom to choose is defined by my ignorance of that remote future choice and its consequences, then by definition all the choices I make as a creature are free—free from my own knowledge of their future occurrences, outcomes, consequences, effects and causalities. So it can be said, even with great confidence, that my finitude actually establishes my power to make real choices that are born out of genuine freedom. Though God knows and thus determines the future as a consequence of His knowledge, He neither sins nor is the author of sin because we, His creatures, make real choices motivated by our desires, thus we are culpable. I refer to this as covenantal determinism—God had determined that His creatures would disobey. All of us are in covenant relationship to God—the unbeliever stands condemned by the Law, assuming he can obtain eternal pleasure by his good works, and the believer stands just before God by the gracious application of Christ’s work to his account. But in both cases we are called to obey God’s Law because He has made us and stamped us with His image. But as His creatures, He has ordained that we have the ability and even the inclination to break His Law. So, even though God has determined beforehand that I will at various points in my life, break His Law, I am still censurable because my choice to do so is born out of genuine creaturely freedom—ergo, covenantal determinism.


Friday, September 18, 2009

God's Knowledge, Who Can Know it? - part 9

Eight revealing questions (continued with questions 1-4)
     Now to go about answering those eight questions:
1.        The first question is: does God know my choice? Even though the choice I have made or will make had not yet happened before I made it, in as far as they are bound in time and based on the testimony of Scripture; I can say that God knew the choices I would eventually make.
2.        If that is true then we must also ask the question, was my choice free? And again, based on Scripture, I say yes, God can know what I will choose and my choice remains free. My freedom is established in the fact that I choose according to my strongest desire. As a mater of fact I will always choose based on my strongest inclination which I am capable of fulfilling.  My will not only influences my decisions, it determines them in the immediate sense. The fact that I always do what I want to do establish the compatibility between God’s ordination and knowledge of my choice and the freedom of my choice.
3.        Can I be forced to choose something that I ultimately do not want? I would say no, not if I have the capacity to do that which I desire.  Following are three examples used to illustrate this point.
a.        Perhaps one day I decide I would like to fly by my own power, no assistance, no wings, and no devises. Right up front we must acknowledge the fact that I do not have the capacity of unassisted flight and my shear willing it to happen is unrealistic and irrational. So if two choices are before me, under normal circumstances I will always choose that which I most strongly desire; that to which I am most strongly inclined. But this circumstance is abnormal. Nearly every kid has at one time or another wanted to simply jump into the air and fly. He may even have a very strong desire to fly. However, he may not legitimately choose that which seems to be his strongest desire because he cannot choose it. He may have a powerful inward desire to fly but he is incapable of inclining himself to fulfill it. This leads us to a consequent question, can one actually desire most strongly, that for which he has no natural capacity? I may have a strong inclination to fly but I have no empathetic understanding of its mechanics, thus I do not understand what it would really mean to fly; I am not actually aware of the work and effort that would be involved, therefore I do not actually desire to fly, but what I desire is my understanding of what flying is. I desire a caricature of flying, but not flying itself. So I conclude that one cannot most strongly desire that for which one has no natural capacity to do or to even understand. This is the futile wish, and it is most probably the exclusive province of sentient beings and a condition of the fall, because we know that we will not even be able to desire anything we cannot do or have in the eternal state with God. So once in God’s eternal presence we will have no need or want for things we cannot have; there will be no futility to our desires. Perhaps Hell in some part consists of eternally unfulfilled futile wishes and unsatisfied desires.
b.       The second example is only slightly different. Imagine being tied to a chair by an abductor. This example illustrates both a lack of capacity and a conflict between contiguous desires, desires that appear to be very close in strength with an inappreciable difference. In this situation you would obviously have a very strong desire to be free. On the one hand, you may actually be able to free yourself when your abductor turns his back or leaves the room but it would result in having to pull one of your wrists out of socket, or cut off your hand by vigorously rubbing it against the cords with which your hands are tied. Even these choices lend themselves to a degree of capacity—can you actually pull your wrist out of socket, will the cord cut through your hand, or can you twist your arm enough to pull your hand off at the wrist in order to free yourself. Even if you are able to free yourself in one of these ways, you must also consider what would happen next. Will you bleed to death from your wounds? Once you are free from the chair will you then be able to defend yourself with such a handicap? Now it becomes a matter of discretion rather than capacity. Though you have a very strong desire to be free from the chair, you choose not to remove or dislocate your hand because that was your strongest desire. Though you very much want to be free, your stronger desire is to leave your hand attached to your arm, so in the end you chose the strongest between several contiguous desires.
c.        Imagine I am driving down the road with every intention of taking a right at the next stop light however, as I sit in line waiting for the light to turn green, a man jumps in the back of my car and while holding a gun to my head he demands that I turn left at the light and insists that he will kill me if I don’t do as he says. I now have an added element in the choice I would make. Had the man never jumped in my car I would have turned right because that is the direction I most strongly desired to go. But now, because of the threat to my life (which will end up being a determining cause in my choice) I choose to turn left.  Does this mean that I have done something that I did not want to do? While I would have had the desire and the capacity to turn right at the light, my stronger desire was to save my life by turning left. Because of the introduction of another efficient cause (the threat to my life) the formal cause (the motivation to preserve my life) was altered, thus the conflict was no longer simply between turning left or right. The conflict would then be between turning right and preserving my life, and because I more strongly desired to preserve my life than to turn right, I fulfilled my stronger affection toward one of two contiguous desires by turning left. So I develop two very important presuppositions: that I cannot ultimately be forced to do something that I don’t want to, and I cannot actually desire that which I have no natural capacity to do. Thus I have also answered the next question.
4.        Why do I choose what I choose?  The answer is very simple; I choose what I choose because my choice reflects the desires of my heart.

Wednesday, September 16, 2009

God's Knowledge, Who Can Know it? - part 8


     At this point, for those of you who are familiar with the previous series I posted about two years ago regarding this topic, you will begin to see the repetition, particularly concerning the eight questions.
Eight revealing questions
As the discussion of providence, compatibility and God’s knowledge unfolds, I believe eight questions must be answered. I don’t believe that the answer to these questions alone will lead one to saving faith in the God they are intended to describe.  In other words, a mere description of the biblical Christian God does not demand a trust in Him; just like a mere description of blackberry cobbler doesn’t necessitate a desire for or an attraction to it.  In fact, unless the Spirit softens the hearer to the Word of God in addition to the description of Him, it is likely that the hearer will despise the God being described.  Poignantly enough, the “open god” and the “Molinistic god” do not promulgate such disgust; they rather cater to the tastes of dead men, normally inoculating them to the real Christian God and His gospel. Following are the series of questions I believe will facilitate a useful discussion of the matter.
  1. Does God know my future choice?
  2. If God knows my future choice, then was my choice free?
  3. Can I be forced to choice something that I ultimately do not want?
  4. Why do I choose what I choose?
  5. What factors determine or cause my choice?
  6. Could I actually have chosen differently?
  7. Can I choose against the decree of God?
  8. Was my choice determined?
     In the next post I will begin my attempt at answering these questions.

Monday, September 14, 2009

God's Knowledge, Who Can Know it? - part 7

My God is bigger than your God
“The Ultimate end which God decreed he regarded as great enough and glorious enough that it justified to himself both the divine plan itself and he ordained incidental "evil arising along the foreordained path to his plan’s great and glorious end.[i]”
There is a segment of Christian theologians who propose that God appears more sovereign, that His sovereignty is better proclaimed in a system of providence that supports real contingencies. I call this the: my God is bigger than your God syndrome. They critique the Reformed view of God’s knowledge of future events by saying that it minimizes His sovereignty to suggest that He had to “stack the deck in His favor”. Referring of course to the Reformed doctrine of God’s decree and that He knows the future because He has decreed all events to come to pass. They submit that God appears more sovereign if He has to work around the libertarian free will choices of man in order to accomplish His purposes.
Besides there being no biblical evidence to support such a view of God’s providence, the biblical and logical evidence is mounted firmly against such an absurd assertion. If a person refuses to see in the biblical testimony that one event in history can simultaneously be meant for evil by the creature and meant for ultimate good by the Creator, then a conclusion like the one above will likely be made. Let us consider what is actually being said here: God is sovereign therefore He knows what will happen if Joseph’s brothers sell him into slavery and if Joseph’s brothers do not sell him into slavery. In contrast, the Reformed position says that God is sovereign therefore He decreed that Joseph’s brothers would sell him into slavery so He could eventually raise Joseph up in Egypt to “keep many people alive”. Middle Knowledge protests that Compatibilism destroys the genuine freedom of man, and thus also destroys his culpability. It also asserts that the later system makes God the author of evil.  Compatibilism accuses Middle Knowledge of absurdity: that God cannot both, know the future choices of men perfectly, and consent to the existence of contingencies.
In order to build an argument against Middle Knowledge let’s concede the point momentarily and say that God knows all things that might possibly happen, but He also knows what will certainly happen. In the system there are many different potential events but only certain events will actually occur. God knows both the events that will actually occur and all those that only have the potential to exist but will never actually occur. Assuming the pendant for Middle Knowledge doesn’t fall into Open Theism and deny the orthodox and biblical doctrine of God’s omniscience, then they would have to admit that the events which God knows will certainly happen will never actually—not happen, and that which He knows will possibly but not certainly happen will always—not happen.  So what does this mean for the potential events? Well, the advocate of middle knowledge says that libertarian free will is preserved therein and that God is also protected from being the author of evil. Yet the same theologian would promote God’s perfect knowledge of the future events, which renders those “possible” events inert. At best they are only alternate plans that God did not choose. In the end the advocate of the system of middle knowledge essentially has the same problem that he thinks he is solving by adopting a system contrary to the compatibilistic one, namely—that God knew beforehand that sin would exist yet He created anyway thus the same charge (the one that says that God is the author of evil) could be leveled at them. The reason being, that God didn’t ordain or decree even sinful events in their system, He carelessly created a world wherein sin would exist and it would exist ultimately without a purpose, except (I guess) to have some force against which God could display His power to overcome it.   It makes one ask why God chose the strand of reality that included sin. One would think that in a system of an infinite number of real contingencies that there existed a strand of reality without sin. Perhaps the answer lies in the fact that they would probably say that God does not determine the strand which He will choose—it is chosen by Him as a result of the future choices men would make.  That makes a transition into the second problem that middle knowledge fails to solve.  The same type of problem remains for them even regarding the libertarian free will of man (that which is defined as the ability to have done so or to have done otherwise, without any external or internal determinants). If God knows the future without error, then man cannot make a choice different than that which God knows he will make. To suggest otherwise is to engage in the futile exercise of attempting to justify a logically and biblically inconceivable doctrine of God’s providence.



[i] Reymond, Robert. A New Systematic Theology of The Christian Faith. (Nashville: Thomas Nelson Publishers, 1998). Page 377

Friday, September 11, 2009

God's Knowledge, Who Can Know it? - part 6

 The bible, openness, and the spaces between (concluded)
     Consider this, if God perfectly knew that Adam would sin then one must conclude that, from God’s perspective, it was impossible for him not to sin. If it was impossible for him not to sin then God’s knowledge of this necessarily negated non-event would be trivial and gratuitous—why would He bother to know it? Is it actually knowledge if it is of something that defiantly would not occur? In other words, if God knew for certain that Adam would sin then God’s knowledge of an alternate strand of reality wherein Adam would not sin was not an actual possibility at all—in fact it was an eternal non-possibility. Even if God, as Middle Knowledge affirms, knows what we will do regardless of our choice, and even if He knows beforehand and He has made a different plan or response for each possible choice, that view then argues against His omnipotence—his ability to affect His creation to whatever end He wills. Rather than presenting God as the Omnipotent One who does as He pleases in His creation, (in an attempt to separate God so far from sin and evil) the mediate theologian presents a God who doesn’t ordain any event, but simply approves or disapproves by being the “Omnipraeoptor”, or the One who chooses all things beforehand from a set of preexisting items. This is not an affirmation of the biblical portrayal of the sovereign, omnipotent, omniscient God but rather, it is an attack on it.
In the face of all the biblical evidence to the contrary, many evangelicals (practically speaking if not formally) espouse a view of God’s sovereignty that does not believe that things are going just as He had planned. We must agree that God’s moral will is broken all the time. There isn’t a day that goes by when His the commands of His law are not flagrantly violated, but as for the will of God’s decree, that will by which He has ordained all the future and by which He knows all its intricacies, no one can undermine—thus the reformed faith has the theological basis and desire to proclaim that things are going as God had planned.  Clark Pinnock objects:
“We do not see how one can have genuine freedom (human and divine) and exhaustive definite foreknowledge. Future free acts, by definition, cannot be known in every detail and with certainty even by God. It is enough to say that God knows everything any being could possibly know. This leaves room for human persons to act and room for God to act, since the future is open to them both. The future is still being formed; that is, everything has not been decided.[i]”
The assumption in Pinnock’s position and the position of the person who does not believe that things are going as planned are, in this respect, the same—that humans have libertarian free will—the capacity for contrary choice; the freedom to act contrary to their own nature and without any such internal or external boundaries. Perhaps God would prefer a world without sin but because He has (in his sovereignty some would inconsistently assert) given His creatures “real” freedom He must endure their sins against His desires. Pinnock maintains that there are things that God does not know, but others who reject the Reformed notion of God’s sovereignty claim that God is omniscient. They both uphold libertarian freedom and they both share Pinnock’s conclusion that there is room for God to act and room for human persons to act.  Pinnock just arrives at this conclusion more consistently because he understands that in order for humans to actually be free and have the power of contrary choice, and in order to establish their freedom, no being can have prescient knowledge of their choices.  I think that the logical implication of many Evangelical views on this topic should be Open Theism, but thank God they remain inconsistent.
Let’s take a closer look at how the Middle Knowledge theory plays out. If within God’s own consideration of the future, Adam had equal capacity and opportunity to either sin or not, yet God knew that Adam would definitely sin, then there was no real possibility that Adam would not sin. So in contrast, the Open Theist consistently concludes that God didn’t know whether Adam would sin or not, thus Adam really did have the possibility of contrary choice because God’s perfect knowledge of that choice didn’t determine the future for him. In fact, if Open Theism were true then the outcome of Adam’s choice had nothing to contradict. If God didn’t know it, then either choice Adam made would have no prescient knowledge with which to be contrary. Unfortunately, at this particular point, the Middle position renders many professing evangelicals apathetically inconsistent. It is a farce to say that God actually knew perfectly that Adam would sin, yet Adam still had the real possibility of not sinning, the two assertions are mutually exclusive.


[i] Pinnock, Clark. Same source as endnote 4.